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 PRECEDENTIAL 
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FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 10-3501 
___________ 
 
JOHN A. HARTMANN, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
Tax Court No. 09-27758 
(Tax Court Judge: Honorable Robert N. Armen, Jr.) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 15, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT,  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed  March 22, 2011) 
_____________ 
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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 John A. Hartmann appeals from the decision of the 
United States Tax Court granting the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue’s (“IRS”) motion for summary judgment in 
this action to collect unpaid taxes.  Because Hartmann’s 
arguments on appeal do not demonstrate the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact, or that the IRS is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the 
decision of the Tax Court. 
 
I. 
 
 Hartmann filed a federal income tax return for 2006, 
but did not pay the liability reported on the return.  The IRS 
subsequently assessed the delinquent tax, along with interest 
and a failure-to-pay penalty and issued Hartmann a notice and 
demand for payment.  After Hartmann failed to remit 
payment, the IRS sent him a final notice of intent to levy 
upon his property, and informed him of his right to request a 
collection due process hearing (“CDP”).1  Hartmann filed a 
                                                 
1
 CDP hearings are informal proceedings that provide a 
delinquent taxpayer with an opportunity to be heard before 
the IRS can levy upon his or her property in order to satisfy 
outstanding tax liabilities.  See generally 26 U.S.C. § 6330.  
During the hearing, the taxpayer is permitted, inter alia, to 
propose collection alternatives such as a settlement or 
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timely request for a CDP hearing and indicated that he 
intended to propose a tax collection alternative.  Following an 
October 2009 CDP hearing, and after failing to receive 
documentation from Hartmann in support of a tax collection 
alternative, the IRS Office of Appeals issued a Notice of 
Determination approving the proposed levy.    
 
 Hartmann timely challenged that determination before 
the Tax Court.  The IRS moved for summary judgment.  In 
May 2010, the Tax Court granted the IRS’ motion for 
summary judgment and sustained the determination made by 
the IRS.  Hartmann timely appealed from that order. 
 
II. 
 
 The Tax Court had jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 
6330(d)(1), and we have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 
7482(a)(1).  We exercise plenary review of the Tax Court’s 
order granting the IRS’ summary judgment motion.  See 
Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d 136, 143 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  Like Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 121(b) of the Tax Court Rules of Practice 
and Procedure provides that summary judgment may be 
                                                                                                             
payment schedule, and the Settlement Officer ultimately must 
determine whether the proposed levy “balances the need for 
the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of 
the person that any collection action be no more intrusive 
than necessary.”  Id. at § 6330(c)(3).  The Settlement 
Officer’s decision generally is reviewable by the Tax Court 
for abuse of discretion.  See Kindred v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 
688, 694 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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granted “if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, 
depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may 
be rendered as a matter of law.”  Craig v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 
252, 259-60 (2002). 
 
III. 
 
 We conclude that Hartmann has failed to demonstrate 
that the Tax Court erred in granting the IRS’s summary 
judgment motion.  Hartmann argues here, as he did before the 
Tax Court, that the levy upon his property cannot be sustained 
because the IRS improperly refused to consider a proposed 
tax collection alternative to satisfy his delinquent federal 
income taxes.  Contrary to Hartmann’s assertion, the record 
demonstrates that the IRS did provide him with an 
opportunity to submit a proposed collection alternative with 
supporting documentation, but that he failed to timely do so.     
 
 In a September 3, 2009 letter, the Settlement Officer 
(“SO”) assigned to Hartmann’s case informed him that the 
IRS would consider a proposed collection alternative, but 
that, in support of such a proposal, Hartmann had to submit 
certain documentation.  (See Tax Court Record at 4.)  
Specifically, the letter stated that Hartmann had to provide the 
following within fourteen days of the date of the letter: (1) a 
completed collection information statement (IRS Form 433-A 
for individuals and/or Form 433-B for businesses); (2) signed 
copies of his 2007 and 2008 tax returns; (3) proof of his 
estimated tax payments for 2009; (4) IRS Form 656 (offer in 
compromise); (5) the application fee; and (6) an advance 
partial payment.  Listed as enclosures to the letter were Form 
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433-A, Form 433-B, and Form 656.  Id.  The letter also 
informed Hartmann that a telephone hearing with the SO was 
scheduled for October 7, 2009.  Id. 
 
 Hartmann then sent a letter to the SO asking that the 
CDP hearing be rescheduled and, per his request, it was 
rescheduled for October 20, 2009.  The parties do not dispute 
that Hartmann and the SO discussed his desire to have an 
installment payment agreement during the hearing.  However, 
at that time, Hartmann had neither submitted the required 
documentation, nor had he made a partial payment.  On 
October 26, 2009, after failing to receive the documentation 
that the SO requested in the September 3, 2009 letter, the IRS 
Office of Appeals issued Hartmann a Notice of Determination 
sustaining the proposed levy.     
 
 Hartmann argued for the first time on petition to the 
Tax Court that he was effectively denied the right to file a 
collection alternative proposal because the enclosures 
intended to accompany the SO’s September 3, 2009 letter had 
been omitted.  He also argued that the SO improperly failed 
to remind him of the filing requirements during the October 
20, 2009 CDP hearing, further excusing his obligation to 
comply with them. 
 
 As an initial matter, there is no evidence that 
Hartmann timely complied with any of the requirements for 
filing a collection alternative.  Indeed, he does not dispute the 
Tax Court’s finding that his 2007 and 2008 tax returns were 
not filed until November 6, 2009 and March 11, 2010, 
respectively.  As the Tax Court noted, the record 
demonstrates that the filing requirements were clearly set 
forth in the SO’s September 3, 2009 letter, regardless of 
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whether the enclosures were omitted.   
 
 In his September 23, 2009 letter to the SO, in which he 
acknowledged his receipt of the September 3, 2009 letter, 
Hartmann made no mention of the allegedly missing 
enclosures.  However, Hartmann, who has been involved in 
other proceedings before the IRS, was undoubtedly aware that 
certain forms must be submitted to the IRS before it will 
consider or approve a tax collection alternative.  See 
Hartmann v. Comm’r, 351 F. App’x. 624 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 
 Hartmann’s further assertion that the SO did not 
remind him of the need to submit these materials during the 
October 20, 2009 hearing is of no consequence.  Again, even 
if the assertion were true, there is no dispute that the SO’s 
September 3, 2009 letter explicitly informed him that 
alternative collection methods would not be considered absent 
timely submission of the required documentation.  Therefore, 
we agree with the Tax Court that the IRS did not abuse its 
discretion in sustaining the proposed levy where Hartmann 
failed to comply with the requirements for filing a proposed 
collection alternative.  Cf. Christopher Cross, Inc. v. United 
States, 461 F.3d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[t]he failure to 
timely pay owed taxes is a perfectly reasonable basis for 
rejecting an offer in compromise relating to other unpaid 
taxes”); Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 152-54 (1st 
Cir. 2005) (no abuse of discretion in rejecting an offer in 
compromise where taxpayer failed to provide financial 
information during the administrative hearing). 
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the Tax 
Court. 
